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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the full scope of the poor decisions made by the Brazilian oil 
giant, Petroleo Brasileiro. This paper is focused on the midst of a corruption scandal that ended 
the hopes and dreams of an entire nation. Fundamental analysis as well as technical analysis are 
used to determine the intrinsic value of Petrobras. Petroleo Brasileiro is analyzed as an oil 
company, as a mother company for the Brazilian economy and as the disruptor of a recession 
that will be remembered historically.     
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Introduction 
One day it finally happened. Millions of Brazilians were gathered at Ipanema beach 
waiting for the final decision. The envelope was opened and Lula da Silva, former president, and 
the entire Brazilian delegation broke into tears. The dream started on October 2nd of 2009 when 
Rio de Janeiro was chosen to be the host city for the 2016 Olympics. With the 2014 Soccer 
World Cup, Brazil had two major events to make their big entrance and show the rest of the 
world that the next global power was stepping into the big stage. Unfortunately, things did not 
start in 2009, they started in 2004 when Petrobras decided to start colluding with other 
companies. They formed a cartel with many of the biggest construction and service work 
companies and they would decide who wins all the contracts to build refineries, acquire rigs or 
offer any type of services to the oil giant (Segal, 2015). Just like that, a culture centered in 
corruption began and completely faded any illusions of prosperity that every Brazilian had when 
awarded the Olympics in 2009.  
Petrobras was powering the Brazilian economy through an expansion phase that seemed 
endless in 2012 when making all the preparations for the World Cup. Things drastically changed 
and now Brazil is suffering a recession accompanied with over 10% real adjusted inflation. What 
changed? How did prosperity become desperation? How a nation full of dreams and hopes 
became a nation full of doubts and anger? This paper will analyze the roots of the biggest 
scheme in Brazilian history and how Petrobras became the key to explaining the recession. This 
paper finds that Petrobras scandal had a major impact in the Brazilian economy. This paper is 
valuable to the literature of energy finance since it analyzes one of the most important energy 
companies from emerging markets. The valuation and financial analysis of Petrobras also 
suggest major problems in the future as the company tries to rebuild their reputation and 
financial stability.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature in industry 
features. Section 3 introduces the company profile that includes a general description, revenue 
breakdown and the analysis of current price targets. Section 4 summarizes the Petrobras scandal 
and gives key participants and characteristics of the scheme. Section 5 presents a financial 
analysis in terms of liquidity, leverage, activity, profitability and price. Section 6 presents a 
valuation of Petrobras in terms of discounted cash flow and a comps model. Section 7 focuses on 
technical analysis with a candlestick chart and a point and figure chart. Section 8 summarizes the 
effect of Petrobras scandal on the Brazilian economy and section 9 lists the conclusions of my 
findings.  
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Industry Features  
 
Petroleo Brasileiro is part of the oil, gas and consumable fuels industry and the integrated 
oil and gas sub-industry. The rapid decline in oil prices since the end of 2014 has had a 
tremendous impact in the energy sector. According to S&P Capital IQ, “the 11.3% drop for the 
energy sector in 2014 underperformed against the 11.4% increase in the S&P 500 and in the first 
11 months of 2015, the sector declined 15.6% compared with a 1.0% increase for the S&P 1500 
index” (S&P Capital IQ, 2015b). As for the outlook of the next quarters, the views in the 
industry are starting to change from negative to neutral mainly due to a global projection made 
by the International Energy Agency, which estimates an increase in demand for oil approximate 
to 1.2 million barrels per day (S&P Capital IQ, 2015e).      
 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the industry in terms of market capitalization. Close to 
78% of this industry is comprised of the oil & gas exploration & production sub-industry and the 
integrated oil & gas sub-industry, both of which can be considered as upstream operations. 
Midstream and downstream operations comprise the remaining 22% market capitalization of the 
industry.   
 
Figure 1: Breakdown of the Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels Industry 
 
 
 
*Source: S&P Capital IQ (2015c) 
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Figure 2 displays a ten-year net income margins volatile trend with some key features. In 
2015, the net margin plummeted for three consecutive quarters, going from -3.1% to -10.6% by 
the end of the third quarter and this marks the first time going back to 2005 that the oil, gas & 
consumable fuels industry registered consecutive negative net income margin quarters within the 
same year (S&P Capital IQ, 2015d).  
 
Figure 2: Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels Net Income Margin 
 
 
 
*Source: S&P Capital IQ (2015d) 
 
The plummet in both earnings and revenues for the industry throughout 2015 have had 
many oil companies like Petroleo Brasileiro struggle tremendously, even more so with the lack 
of growth in GDP in Brazil. Even though the stage tumbled in 2015, the industry is expected to 
experience a modest recovery by the end of 2016. This recovery will be dependent upon 
reducing completion costs and drilling as well as increasing efficiency gains. It is imperative that 
exploration & production lower their levels of activity to aid in the fight against this prolonged 
decline of the sector (S&P Capital IQ, 2015a). As I take a top-down approach for the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of Petroleo Brasileiro, it is important to take into account the recent 
industry activity discussed above.   
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Company Profile 
 
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. is a Brazilian based company that explores, produces, refines, 
and supplies oil and natural gas. Short named Petrobras owns and operates petrochemical units, 
oil tankers, river and lake terminals, fertilizer plants, thermal power plants and distribution 
pipelines across the vast Brazilian territory with main operations in South America (Bloomberg, 
2016h). With a market capitalization above $30 billion, Petrobras is the biggest company in 
South America and one of the biggest producers of oil in the world. Aldemir Bendine has been 
recently selected as the new Chief Executive Officer and the company employs over 80 thousand 
people (Bloomberg, 2016h). It is important to note that Petrobras is a mixed joint stock 
corporation and the more than half of the voting rights are controlled by the government of 
Brazil (Standard & Poor’s, 2016a). 
 
Table 1 displays the revenue breakdown from different operations incurred by Petrobras. 
Their largest portion of revenue comes from refining & marketing.  
 
Table 1: Revenue Breakdown 
 
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Revenue Breakdown 
Refining & Marketing 50.85% 
Midstream - Oil & Gas 28.28% 
Oil & Gas Services & Equipment 11.28% 
Exploration & Production 9.57% 
Biofuels 0.02% 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016i)  
 
Across 61 years of operations, Petrobras has been portrayed as the heart and soul of the 
Brazilian economy. Its presence and reputation were always valued highly. This company 
contributed to the Brazilian culture as the main sponsor of multiple local productions and its 
image was that of security, transparence and joy. Unfortunately, in 2014 everything changed and 
now Petroleo Brasileiro is struggling like never before.  
 
In April of 2015, Petrobras had astonishing $17 billion write-downs in the fourth quarter 
all associated with the ongoing corruption scandal, which we will discuss in the next section. The 
legal battle is not the only concern for Petrobras. The company holds a great amount of its debt 
in U.S. dollars and the continued currency devaluation of the Brazilian real has reached 15% 
against the USD year over year (Standard & Poor’s, 2016a). Debt ratios need to be analyzed 
closely as by this time they are above the industry averages. A positive sign is shown by 
Petrobras’ tremendous production potential for the long term that is explained by pre-salt blocks 
located outside of Brazil. However, the short term still involves a lot of risk due to potential 
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declines in oil prices, increased levels of inflation in Brazil and legal accusations that are causing 
political unrest (Standard & Poor’s, 2016a).  
 
Figure 3 shows Petrobras’ target price differential against beta in a four quadrant matrix. 
As the matrix shows, Petrobras falls under the lower right quadrant that is classified as high risk 
and low potential. With a beta close to 2, Petrobras shows greater volatility compared to the 
overall market and the low price target differential targets the stock with low potential 
expectations. According to Standard & Poor’s independent equity research, “PBR is expected to 
grow production by about 1.3% on a barrel of oil equivalent basis in 2016, below the average for 
supermajor oils, and the company also has a considerably higher net debt-to-capital ratio (51% 
versus a peer group average of 13%)” (Standard & Poor’s, 2016a). The decline in earnings and 
the increased uncertainty regarding the future of the company has its roots set in 2014, which I 
will categorize as the Petrobras scandal in the following section.      
 
Figure 3: Risk vs Reward Matrix 
 
 
 
*Source: Standard & Poor’s (2016b) 
 
Petrobras Scandal       
 
Brazil’s rise was empowered by the oil giant Petroleo Brasileiro with some of the biggest 
oil discoveries in the past decade. The surge was so tremendous that government officials started 
making claims regarding near future energy independence. As of April, 2014 things changed 
drastically. The oil giant faced a boiling scandal over the acquisition of a Houston refinery, 
which began in 2006 and was completed years later, because Petrobras acquired it at an 
estimated cost of $1.19 billion from Astra, an oil trading company from Belgium, who only paid 
$42.4 million the year before. (Romero & Thomas, 2014). That is where the legal battle took off 
as more accusations of bribery and wrongdoing emerged. Paulo Roberto Costa, one of 
Petrobras’s high ranked former executives who led operations in refinery until 2012, was 
arrested because of his supposed involvement in a straggling money-laundering arrangement 
where he might have received bribes in order to increase the cost in the constructions of a 
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refinery from $2.5 billion to $18.5 billion (Romero & Thomas, 2014). If you think this is 
troubling, they were just getting started.   
 
Petrobras also faces inspection over many claims that some employees received bribes 
totaling $139 million from SBM Offshore, an oil rigs supplier from Germany (Romero & 
Thomas, 2014). This matter is still under further investigation from federal officials. A different 
investigation is focusing its efforts on a specific contract with Odebrecht, which is one of 
Brazil’s biggest construction and oil services providers. This $825 million contract is claimed to 
be gross overbilled (Romero & Thomas, 2014).  
 
According to Bloomberg, “a team of dedicated federal prosecutors and police 
has conducted 1,114 inquiries, carried out 133 arrests and is pursuing $4 billion in stolen assets, 
with care and little drama” (Margolis, 2016a). Sergio Moro is the man who has the power to take 
down giants as he is the federal judge in charge of this cases. One of the giants taken down was 
nonetheless Odebrecht ex-CEO, Marcelo Odebrecht. The company that was founded by his 
grandfather is the biggest construction company in South America. Marcelo was sentenced to 19 
years in prison because of his involvement in this never ending scandal. The billionaire was 
convicted of organized crime, corruption and money laundering (Dickerson, Magalhaes & 
Lewis, 2016). If this were a fishing contest, we could say that Sergio Moro is catching whales. 
Prosecutors also allege that “some of Brazil’s largest construction firms, including Odebrecht, 
skimmed billions of dollars from Petrobras through inflated contracts, then channeled some of 
the funds to the ruling Workers’ Party and its allies as part of a year’s long pay-to-play scheme” 
(Dickerson, Magalhaes & Lewis, 2016).    
 
The bottom of the iceberg was saved for ex-president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. On 
March 3rd, 2016, claims were made that the former President, most commonly known as Lula, 
arranged a scheme to buy off a witness that was involved in the Petrobras scandal (Margolis, 
2016a). On March 4th, Lula was interrogated by the federal police on the belief that he profited 
from the scandal. Weeks later, in a separate case, prosecutors from the city of Sao Paulo were 
seeking the ex-president’s arrest with charges of false declarations and money laundering. A trial 
could cause Lula a long sentence up to 13 years in prison (Margolis, 2016a). We are talking 
about a man that was beloved by the people of Brazil. An ex-president that left after 8 years of 
prosperity and economic growth. The man that orchestrated the obtention of the Soccer World 
Cup and the Olympic Games.  
 
Despite the astonishing pile of cases, investigations and allegations, it is still very early to 
determine the final conclusion regarding the scandal, but it is certain that the government is now 
on the defensive. On the outside, millions of protesters are flooding the streets of Brazil 
demanding current president Dilma Rousseff to resign while congress starts an impeachment 
drive from the inside (Margolis, 2016a).   
 
Another difficult challenge for Petrobras is that their role as a powerful energy company 
is not the only one they have to take. There is a heated debate over the degree to which the 
Brazilian government uses Petrobras’s strength and wealth to achieve economic and political 
goals. For example, President Dilma Rousseff did not allow Petrobras to raise prices in order for 
them to meet the cost of refined diesel and gasoline in an attempt to decelerate inflation during 
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an election year. The results were dramatic as Petrobras lost an approximate $8 billion in 2013 
on their transportation, refining and marketing operations (Romero & Thomas, 2014). Not only 
Petrobras is fighting against corruption, bribery, and bad leadership, but they are also fighting 
against unlimited government power that controls their operations and possibly their future. As 
we learned more about some of the external factors that have led Petrobras into the wrong 
direction, now we will focus on the financial analysis of the company to have a clear picture of 
the damage, stagnation and decline of the Brazilian oil giant.  
 
Financial Analysis 
 
Petroleo Brasileiro was characterized for having incremental revenues from 2005 until 
2011 growing by almost 160% over the course of 7 years. That trend reversed since 2012 when 
the midst of the scandal started to unveil. From 2011 to 2014, gross profit has fallen by 26% and 
net income hit negative $10.9 billion by the end of 2014. I used a compounded annual growth 
rate of negative 4.61% to project gross profit until 2019. The reason I used gross profit instead of 
revenues is because it reflects the incremental cost of revenues that the company has experienced 
since 2012 and has driven gross profit into a negative trend. Earnings per share have fallen from 
2.03 in 2010 to negative 0.71 in 2014. My projections for EBITDA also have a declining trend of 
59% up to 2019. In terms of the balance sheet, I expect a decrease in net fixed assets, which have 
been a key investment target for Petrobras with over $219 billion in 2014. For 2019, my target is 
close to $184 billion. Petrobras has failed in the control of their expenses so they have to cut 
capital expenditures as more and more legal write-downs continue to affect the profitability of 
the company. Petrobras has seen a tremendous increase of 470% in long term liabilities since 
2005, but I expect this to normalize in the following years due to the high cost of debt due to 
current downgrades and increased speculation regarding the future of the Brazilian oil giant. In 
terms of cash flow, cash from operations continues to decline and put pressure on future free 
cash flow. I expect the company to continue to struggle with negative free cash flow in 2016 
close to negative 9.8 billion. To continue our analysis, I will focus on five different categories of 
comparative ratios between Petrobras and five other competitors that we have identified by 
market capitalization.    
 
Table 2 shows four different measures of liquidity to compare Petrobras against its peers. 
Petrobras shows stronger cash, current, and quick ratios mainly because most of their liabilities 
are long term. This is a positive sign in terms of liquidity even though they have among the 
lowest cash to total assets ratio with 5.58%. 
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Table 2: Comparative Ratios of Liquidity 
 
Liquidity Ratios 
Company Name Cash Ratio Current Ratio Quick Ratio 
Cash/Total 
Assets 
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO 0.83 1.63 1.09 5.58% 
TOTAL SA 0.57 1.38 0.93 10.37% 
CHEVRON CORP 0.43 1.34 0.91 4.14% 
ECOPETROL SA 0.43 1.15 0.62 5.33% 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL 0.02 0.60 0.19 6.96% 
BP PLC 0.49 1.29 0.74 10.08% 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016d)     
Table 3 shows five different measures of leverage to compare Petrobras against its peers. 
Petrobras has the lowest S&P credit rating classified as highly speculative and very close to 
substantial risks. Total debt to total equity ratios shows that Petrobras is the company that uses 
the greatest amount of debt to finance its assets relative to stockholder’s equity. Total debt to 
EBITDA is another bad indicator of leverage for Petrobras since they also have the highest 
among its peers. This suggests that the company may have troubles servicing their debt and if 
they want to continue to take on more debt it is going to be difficult to convince creditors as they 
see this metrics.              
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Table 3: Comparative Ratios of Leverage 
 
Leverage Ratios 
Company Name S&P Rating 
Total 
Debt/Total 
Equity 
Total 
Debt/EBITDA 
Total 
Debt/Capital  
Financial 
Leverage  
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO B+ 112.97% 6.75 53.05% 2.35 
TOTAL SA A+ 56.66% 2.36 36.17% 2.48 
CHEVRON CORP AA- 25.08% 1.92 20.05% 1.73 
ECOPETROL SA BBB 117.67% 6.47 54.06% 2.37 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL N/A 51.63% 1.81 34.05% 2.44 
BP PLC A- 54.05% 2.54 35.08% 2.62 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016c)      
 
Table 4 shows three different measures of activity to compare Petrobras against its peers. 
In terms of activity, Petrobras falls closely with the industry average except on the cash 
conversion cycle. This is a very important metric that measures the effectiveness of management 
to employ liabilities and short term assets in order to generate cash for the company. Petrobras 
has the highest among its peers, which shows the constant problem we have detected all along 
this analysis, which is poor management.  
 
Table 4: Comparative Ratios of Activity 
 
Activity Ratios 
Company Name 
Inventory 
Turnover 
Cash Conversion 
Cycle 
Accounts Payable 
Turnover  
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO 8.05 28.51 9.65 
TOTAL SA N/A N/A 5.61 
CHEVRON CORP 18.46 13.86 7.30 
ECOPETROL SA 12.17 -26.03 4.43 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL 11.85 14.25 11.94 
BP PLC 12.41 19.85 9.90 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016b)    
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Table 5 shows five different measures of profitability to compare Petrobras against its 
peers. Petrobras has the second lowest ROE and ROA among its peers. This shows the inability 
of the company to generate returns and the negative return on assets simply add more concern 
towards the future of the company. Return on invested capital is higher than ROE, but it is still 
below industry average. However, Petrobras has the highest EBIT and EBITDAX margins, 
which shows better cost management even when we add exploration expenses.    
 
Table 5: Comparative Ratios of Profitability 
 
Profitability Ratios 
Company Name 
Return on 
Equity  
Return on 
Assets  
Return on 
Invested 
Capital 
EBIT 
Margin  
EBITDAX 
Margin  
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO 1.55% -2.80% 2.46% 12.21% 17.38% 
TOTAL SA 9.13% 3.75% 1.92% 7.27% 11.52% 
CHEVRON CORP 4.13% 2.38% -1.63% -0.79% 14.14% 
ECOPETROL SA -7.13% -3.01% 7.95% 2.79% 15.79% 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL 3.86% 1.53% 5.70% 2.08% 6.26% 
BP PLC 3.80% 1.45% -3.80% 1.76% 3.01% 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016f)      
 
Table 6 shows four different measures of price to compare Petrobras against its peers. 
P/E suggests lower earnings growth for Petrobras as the 2 year forward is 16.88. The enterprise 
multiple is in line with its peers and Petrobras is the only company that does not pay dividends.     
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Table 6: Comparative Ratios of Price 
 
Price Ratios 
Company Name 
Est P/E 
Current Yr. 
P/E - FY2 EV/EBITDAX Dvd 12M Yld 
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO 26.88 16.88 6.30 N/A 
TOTAL SA 15.89 11.43 7.80 5.69 
CHEVRON CORP 64.69 19.31 8.56 4.38 
ECOPETROL SA 17.32 6.57 4.55 10.04 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL 15.38 14.98 N/A 5.06 
BP PLC 26.38 12.36 4.80 7.49 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016e)     
 
Company Valuation 
 
In order to find the intrinsic value of Petroleo Brasileiro, I developed a discounted cash flow 
model and a comps model based on price to earnings and enterprise value to EBITDA. The 
following figures illustrates my analysis.  
 
Figure 4 shows the discounted cash flow model for Petroleo Brasileiro. I used the fair value 
multiple method to determine the share price of Petrobras. The market risk premium was found 
by subtracting the expected market return by the 10-year treasury. To find the CAPM cost of 
equity I multiplied beta times the market risk premium and added the 10-year treasury. The after 
tax cost of debt was calculated using a 10% tax rate. With this information and the percentages 
of debt and equity of the company I calculated a weighted average cost of capital of 31.2%. The 
perpetual growth of the firm’s cash flow was not utilized since I chose a fair value method 
instead of a perpetuity method in order to reduce the number of assumptions in the model. With 
the weighted average cost of capital, I was able to calculate the discount factor. With the 
discount factor, we found the present value free cash flows to the firm. Terminal value was 
calculated by multiplying the EBITDA multiple at the last forecast of EBITDA. By discounting 
the terminal value to the present, I was able to calculate an enterprise value of $87.4 billion when 
I added the present value of the terminal value and the present value of the forecast free cash 
flows. By subtracting long term borrowings and adding cash, net debt equaled $56.5 billion and 
an equity value of $30.8 billion. When dividing the equity value by the shares outstanding, we 
concluded that the fair value share price of Petrobras equals $2.36        
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Figure 4: Discounted Cash Flow Model 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the COMPS model for Petroleo Brasileiro. I pulled the price to earnings 
and enterprise value to EBIDTA for Petroleo Brasileiro and their direct competitors to compute 
price from P/E and price from EV/EBITDA. In order to find the share price from P/E I 
multiplied basic earnings per share by the average P/E of all the companies included in the 
analysis. This gives us a fair value price from P/E of $4.94. For the EV/EBITDA setup, I pulled 
the estimated enterprise value from the income statement, subtracted cash and cash equivalents 
and added total debt and minority interest to find an estimated market cap of $29.9 billion. I 
divided basic weighted shares by the estimated market cap to find a fair value price from 
EV/EBITDA of $4.35.  
 
 
 
Assumptions FCFF Fair Value Multiple Method
EBITDA Multiple 6.3x
10 Year US Treasury 1.95% Last forecast EBITDA 21,225
Expected market return 9.03% Terminal Value 132,655
Market risk premium 7.1% Present Value of Terminal Value 34,089
Beta 2.09 Terminal Value as % of Total Value 39.0%
CAPM cost of equity 16.7% Present Value of Forecast FCF 53,387
Cost of debt 37.7% Forecast Period as % of Total Value 61.0%
Tax rate 10.0% Enterprise Value 87,476
After tax cost of debt 33.9% - Long Term Borrowings 80,444
Equity % 15.70% + Cash 23,861
Debt % 84.30% Net Debt 56,582
WACC 31.2% Equity Value (Market Cap) 30,894
Perpetual growth of firm cash flows 
(post year 5) 2.50% Shares outstanding 13,044
Valuation date 15-Mar-16 Fair value share price 2.36833
Projected Fiscal Years Ending December 31
Free Cash Flows 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EBIT 16,282 15,532 14,817 14,134 13,483
EBIT * (1-tax rate) 14,654 13,979 13,335 12,721 12,135
Depreciation And Amortization 9,348 8,918 8,507 8,115 7,741
EBITDA 25,630 24,450 23,324 22,250 21,225
Free cash flows to the firm (FCFF) 24,002 22,897 21,842 20,836 19,877
Years to Discount 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Cost of Capital 31.2% 31.2% 31.2% 31.2% 31.2%
Discount Factor 1.31 1.72 2.26 2.97 3.89
PV Free cash flows to the firm (FCFF) 18,291 13,296 9,666 7,026 5,108
*Al l  the numbers  highl ighted in blue have been retrieved from Bloomberg L.P as  of March 15th, 2016
*Perpetual  growth of fi rm cash flows  is  tied to 10 year US GDP outlook 
Discounted Cash Flow Model - Valuation
* This  model  i s  prepared for educational  purposes  only. It i s  in no way a  sol ici tation to buy/sel l  securi ties , and no 
guarantees  or warranties  about the accuracy of information contained in i t are impl ied.
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Figure 5: COMPS Model 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the computation for the intrinsic value of Petroleo Brasileiro. Since the 
discounted cash flow method relies on many different assumptions, I decided to weight the price 
from this valuation method at 20%. The weights for the price of P/E and EV/EBITDA both equal 
to 40%. The weighted average of these three different valuations method give us a valuation 
price of $4.19. As of April, 8th of 2016, Petrobras is trading at $5.68. Based on this analysis, we 
can conclude that Petrobras is overvalued by 26%. The following figures show other key 
indicators when analyzing the intrinsic value of a company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name P/E EV/EBITDA 
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO 26.881 6.250
STATOIL ASA 32.609 3.567
SUNCOR ENERGY INC - 11.921 PETROLEO BRASILEIRO
HUSKY ENERGY INC - 8.292 EPS Basic 0.19
MOL HUNGARIAN OIL AND GAS PL 9.627 4.334 Basic Weighted Shares 130,444,969       
TOTAL SA 15.895 6.970 Estimated EV 154,772,896.73  
CHEVRON CORP 64.695 8.235 Estimated Market Cap 29,975,699.81
EXXON MOBIL CORP 33.830 10.920
ECOPETROL SA 17.319 6.538
PETROCHINA CO LTD-H 22.062 7.356 EV/EBITDA Setup:
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL-H 15.379 5.575 Estimated EV 154,772,896.73  
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-A SHS 20.320 5.827 - Cash and Equivalents (24,597,472.04)   
REPSOL SA 20.543 5.782 + Total Debt (st debt + lt debt)148,237,414.96  
BP PLC 26.376 5.365 + Preferred Stock -                      
OMV AG 20.036 4.948  + minority interest 1,157,254.00      
YPF S.A.-D 8.498 2.971 Estimated Market Cap 29,975,699.81    
GALP ENERGIA SGPS SA 21.255 9.183
ENI SPA 61.290 5.340
Average 26.038 6.632 Price from P/E 4.94730
Median 20.543 6.039 Price EV/EBITDA 4.35169
Standard Deviation 12.970 2.350
Standard Error 3.0571 0.5539
*Al l  the numbers  perta ined whitin sky-blue cel ls  have been retrieved from Bloomberg L.P as  of March 15th, 2016
*Bas ic EPS have been retrieved from Bloomberg L.P. from the 3rd quarter of 2015
COMPS Model - Valuation
Prices Based on Most Recent Annual Report
* This  model  i s  prepared for educational  purposes  only. It i s  in no way a  sol ici tation to buy/sel l  securi ties , and no 
guarantees  or warranties  about the accuracy of information contained in i t are impl ied.
17 
 
Table 7: Valuation Price for Petrobras 
 
 
 
Technical Analysis  
 
This next section will evaluate Petrobras on a technical analysis basis in order to identify 
trends, resistance levels, support levels and signals of overbought or oversold prices. This 
analysis will help provide a clear picture of how Petrobras is viewed by the market. A 
candlestick chart and a point and figure chart are explained as follows. 
 
Figure 6 shows a candle stick chart from April 2015 to March 2016. We can see a strong 
resistance line forming around $5.50 because we have multiple tests around that line area in 
October, November, December of 2015 and since March of 2016. Petrobras has not been able to 
break above this resistance line showing strong levels of supply at that point. The red line shows 
a 200 day moving average and the blue line shows a 50 day moving average. Since the red line is 
a long term signal and the blue line is a medium term signal, the temporary cross over in June of 
2015 proved to be a false positive signal as the blue line started its decline after the cross over.  
The current price has surpassed the 200 day moving average, which traditionally is a strong 
positive long term signal. However, in this case, because the 50 day moving average is still 
below the 200 day moving average this points towards a short term positive trend. The top part 
of Figure 16 shows a relative strength index for 14 days. With this index we can identify 
overbought and oversold areas within the price movement. The small uptrend since January of 
2016 started with oversold levels of the relative strength index. Currently, Petrobras is 
approaching significantly overbought levels which indicate that the short term positive trend can 
reverse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price from P/E 4.947
Weighting for Price from P/E 40.0%
Price EV/EBITDA 4.352
Weighting for Price EV/EBITDA 40.0%
Price from Discounted Cash Flow 2.368
Weighting for Price DCF 20.0%
Valuation Price 4.193
Intrinsic Value of Petroleo Brasileiro
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Figure 6: Candlestick chart of Petrobras 
  
 
 
*Source: Stockcharts.com (2016a) 
 
Figure 7 shows a point and figure chart since 2012 where the X represents demand and 
the O represents supply for the stock. Supply and demand are showed because the point and 
figure methodology assumes that stock prices are governed by the laws of supply and demand. 
The small numbers in red within the graph represent the months within the year in the horizontal 
axis and the months of October, November and December are represented by the letters A, B and 
C, respectively. The red line represents the bearish resistance level and the blue line represents 
the bullish support level. The resistance line clearly reflects and overall downtrend in the price of 
the stock that pronounces at its greatest at the end of 2014. Since then supply has taken over 
driving the price down below support levels. No other support level has been identified which 
suggests that the downtrend will continue. As you can see in figure 7, since September of 2015 a 
triple top buy signal has been formed and if it is completed, this could signal a short term trend 
reversal.   
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Figure 7: Point and Figure Chart 
 
 
*Source: Stockcharts.com (2016b) 
 
After analyzing the candle stick chart and the point and figure chart we can conclude that 
the overall long term trend is bearish for the stock as we cannot identify new support levels or 
identify an established long term upward trend. This is significant because as traders act on this 
signals it could influence the stock price of Petrobras in a way that differs from the underlying 
fundamentals of the company. 
 
 
20 
 
Impact on Brazil’s Economy  
Corruption is not something new and it does not surprise Brazilians when they hear about 
it in the news. Uniqueness is not a synonym for corruption in a country that has experienced it 
and suffered it for decades. What was not a novelty in this particular Petrobras case was the 
impressive scale and stunning sums. A $3 billion scandal of bribes since 2004 makes other 
corruption cases around the world look like amateur work. If you do not live in Brazil, it is hard 
to understand the enormity of the scandal and the sense of fury and betrayal from its people. 
Petrobras was supposed to play a major role in the future growth of Brazil. According to the New 
York Times, “at one time it was the sixth-largest company in the world by market capitalization 
and accounted for roughly 10 percent of Brazil’s gross domestic product” (Segal, 2015). 
Unfortunately, in 2014 Petrobras lost $70 billion in market cap, which is more than half of its 
value (Segal, 2015).    
Figure 8 shows a comparative returns graph since 2012 with Petrobras against 
IBOVESPA. The dotted line represents the return of the Index and the dark line represents the 
return of Petrobras. Since 2012, Petrobras’ stock price has fallen by 84.49% while the index has 
fallen by 24.60%. Comparing Petrobras against the most representative index of the Brazilian 
stock market gives us a better picture in our attempt to correlate the downtrend of Petrobras with 
the recession currently experienced in Brazil. If compared to an oil and gas index, we will not be 
able to see Petrobras’ overall effect on the economy. According to Bloomberg, IBOVESPA is 
comprised of 61 members and Petrobras has the second largest weight in the index with 7.3% 
(Bloomberg, 2016). Figure X shows a clear correlation in both downtrends, which demonstrates 
Petroleo Brasileiro’s importance for the Brazilian economy.  
Figure 8: Comparative Returns Between Petroleo Brasileiro and IBOVESPA 
 
*Source: Bloomberg L.P. (2016a) 
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A study published in Forbes estimated that “R$87 billion ($27.1 billion) was expected to 
have been lost in GDP this year [2015] because of Petrobras’ corrupt, little ways” (Rapoza, 
2015). This equals to 1% of total GDP, Brazil’s GDP is close to $2.2 trillion, that was simply 
burned by the greediness and self-indulgence uncovered throughout this scandal. Getulio Vargas 
Foundation’s Environmental Solutions and Infrastructure Group estimates that engineering, 
consumer spending, construction and oil and gas service firms will all suffer Petrobras’s 
reduction in investments to cover the costs of the scandal. Federal funds will need at least R13.6 
billion to cover layoffs in construction. OAS and Galvao, important construction companies that 
were involved with Petrobras, did not have another alternative other than filing for bankruptcy 
(Rapoza, 2015). The negative effect on GDP in 2015 does not fully account for all the economic 
losses that this scandal continues to unveil.  
The concern is raised even more when you see millions of people taking the streets 
asking for the president to step down. If this happens, regime change will not change the fact that 
the recession is closer to a depression than a recovery. Aecio Neves, one of the leaders of the 
opposition was also insulted by the crowd. Even the president’s impeachment could raise the 
uncertainty because all the government officials that are in line for replacement are also being 
investigated. “Vice President Michel Temer, who will fall with Rousseff if the court rules their 
campaign was illegally financed; House Speaker Eduardo Cunha, facing trail for bribe-taking; 
and Senate President Renan Calheiros, suspected of money laundering, accepting bribes and tax 
evasion” (Margolis, 2016b). This has gotten to a point were corruption has not only caused the 
recession, but is also stopping the recovery.     
Conclusion  
Taking aside the economic implications of this scandal, an identity crisis has burst among 
the people. Among those taxpayers that have a sense of humiliation, disgrace and outrage. 
Mauricio Santoro, a political science professor at Rio de Janeiro State University said the 
following: “I’ve never seen my countrymen so angry [and] we have this sense that the dream is 
over” (Segal, 2015). The same dream that began on October 2nd of 2009 when Rio de Janeiro 
was chosen as the host city for the 2016 Olympics. That dream has been crashed, but if one good 
thing can come out of all of this is the fact that the cockroaches are coming out sooner or later. 
Our quantitative and qualitative analysis defend our theory that Petrobras had a major impact on 
the current Brazilian recession and our valuation and ratio analysis suggest major problems for 
the future of the company. It is hard to quantify the aftermath because every day new arrests are 
being made and more companies are being implicated. Even though the operation carwash is 
underway to reform the values of the company, cockroach theory suggests that this is far from 
over and we could look as high as the presidential seat for people implicated in this scandal. 
Because as we said from the start, everything in life has consequences.          
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